Category Archives: Damages
September 5, 2012
The Latest From the Federal Circuit on Injunctions, Sunset Royalties, and Future Royalty Rates
Even if you win your patent infringement case, you still may not get an injunction prohibiting ongoing infringement. In a case decided last month by the Federal Circuit, ActiveVideo v. Verizon, a jury found that Verizon infringed ActiveVideo’s method patents pertaining to video-on-demand technology, but the Federal Circuit held that the district court erred by imposing a permanent injunction prohibiting Verizon from future infringement. This is a stark example of the impact of the Supreme Court’s 2006 ruling in Ebay v. MercExchange that injunctions should not automatically issue in patent infringement cases, and worthy of analysis. Also worthy of scrutiny is what Federal Circuit wrote concerning the appropriate royalty Verizon should be required to pay for future use.
I. Injunction
There are four elements courts must consider when deciding whether to impose an injunction after liability has been established: (1) whether the harm to the patent owner is irreparable; (2) whether the harm is compensable with money damages; (3) the balance of the hardships on each of the parties depending on whether the court issues the injunction; and (4) the public interest.
A. Irreparable Harm/Efficacy of Money Damages
The Court determined that the injury suffered by ActiveVideo as a result of Verizon’s infringement would be compensable by money damages, and would not be irreparable. The following chart depicting the manner in which the court weighed facts pertaining to irreparable injury.
| Factors Favoring Irreparable Harm | Factors Weighing Against Irreparable Injury | Non-Factors |
| The parties are not direct competitors | Litigation costs – the Federal Circuit held that litigation costs cannot constitute irreparable harm | |
| License non-exclusive – ActiveVideo could maintain its existing license to Cablevision and also license Verzion | Loss of market share by ActiveVideo’s licensee Cablevision – the Federal Circuit held that if Verizon takes a customer away from ActiveVideo’s licensee Cablevision, the only harm ActiveVideo suffers is loss of a license fee from Verizon | |
| Ease of quantifying a license fee – Cablevision paid ActiveVideo 17 cents a month per subscriber, Verizon could be required to pay monthly per subscriber also | Loss of business opportunity or brand recognition could constitute irreparable injury, but neither was proven | |
| Verizon is able to pay the license fee – the Federal Circuit distinguished the Bosch v. Pylon Mfg. case, in which the Federal Circuit held that the fact that the defendant might not be able to pay a license fee contributed to irreparable injury | ||
| No evidence of damage to ActiveVideo’s brand name because Cablevision markets its service using the “io” name, not the Activevision name, so retail customers are unlikely to associate Activision with the service | ||
| Verizon’s service increases demand for VOD overall and therefore increases opportunities for ActiveVideo | ||
| No evidence of price erosion | ||
| ActiveVideo sought to broadly license its patents, including to Verizon | ||
| ActiveVideo wiling to extend sunset licensing period |
B. Balance of Hardships
The Federal Circuit held that the balance of hardships favored the infringer. It analyzed the factors as follows.
| Factors Favoring Patent Owner | Factors Favoring Infringer | Non-factors |
| Sunset licensing fee alone would generate, in one month, 70% of what patent owner earned in its entire 23 year history | Patent owner’s small size | |
| Patent owner would only suffer if not compensated |
C. Public Interest
The Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s finding that the public interest in enforcing the patent owner’s right to exclude outweighed the interest the infringer’s customers may have in maintaining their access to entertainment. But the court held that the public interest factor could not outweigh the other two, explaining:
If the general public interest in upholding patent rights alone was sufficient to mandate injunctive relief when none of the other three factors support injunctive relief, then we would be back to the general rule that a patentee should always receive an injunction against infringement. But the Supreme Court rejected the idea that there is a general rule that courts should issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393-94. We vacate the grant of a permanent injunction in this case and remand for the district court to consider an appropriate ongoing royalty rate for future infringement by Verizon.
II. Sunset Royalties
A sunset royalty is, as its name implies, a royalty an infringer must pay while it phases out its infringing product. The district court imposed a sunset royalty far greater than the amount paid by ActiveMedia’s licensee, Cablevision. The Federal Circuit upheld the higher royalty amount, explaining:
The district court accepted ActiveVideo’s expert testimony that Verizon received an incremental profit of $6.86 per FiOS-TV subscriber per month. The court analyzed the respective bargaining positions of the parties post-verdict, and concluded that “it would have been reasonable for the parties to make an agreement whereby Verizon would receive 60% of the profits and ActiveVideo would receive 40% of the profits.” This results in the $2.74 per subscriber per month royalty. The district court rejected Verizon’s suggestion that it should pay the same rate as Cablevision. The district court found that after the patent is held not invalid and infringed by Verizon, ActiveVideo is in a much better bargaining position with Verizon than it was with Cablevision in 2009. Based on the fact that Verizon may be able to design around, but does not know precisely how effective such a design around might be, the court discounted the profit split from the 50/50 to 60/40 (in favor of Verizon).
This may seem high, and while it is likely true that Verizon would not have agreed to that amount prior to litigation, Verizon has been adjudicated to infringe and the patent has been held not invalid after a substantial challenge by Verizon. See Paice [LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.], 504 F.3d at 1317 (Rader, J., concurring) (“[P]re-suit and post-judgment acts of infringement are distinct, and may warrant different royalty rates given the change in the parties’ legal relationship and other factors.”); Amado [v. Microsoft], 517 F.3d at 1362 (“Prior to judgment, liability for infringement, as well as the validity of the patent, is uncertain, and damages are determined in the context of that uncertainty. Once a judgment of validity and infringement has been entered, however, the calculus is markedly different because different economic factors are involved.”). The district court is correct; there has been a substantial shift in the bargaining position of the parties. See Amado, 517 F.3d at 1362 (“There is a fundamental difference, however, between a reasonable royalty for pre-verdict infringement and damages for post-verdict infringement.”). We reject Verizon’s argument that the district court erred in concluding that the jury verdict placed ActiveVideo in a stronger bargaining position.
III. Future Royalties
Because the Federal Circuit vacated the injunction, it now becomes necessary for the district court to fix a royalty for the infringer to pay going forward. The court offered the following comparison of sunset and ongoing royalties, and guidance for the district court on remand:
We held in Amado that an assessment of prospective damages for ongoing infringement should “take into account the change in the parties’ bargaining positions, and the resulting change in economic circumstances, resulting from the determination of liability.” Amado, 517 F.3d at 1362. And, although Amado dealt with the imposition of royalty damages while an injunction was stayed during appeal, this holding applies with equal force in the ongoing royalty context. Though we vacate the district court’s injunction, we see no error in its post-verdict royalty calculation. The district court, on remand, should determine an appropriate ongoing royalty, an inquiry that is much the same as its sunset royalty analysis. The district court may wish to consider on remand additional evidence of changes in the parties’ bargaining positions and other economic circumstances that may be of value in determining an appropriate ongoing royalty. See Paice, 504 F.3d at 1315 (“Upon remand, the court may take additional evidence if necessary to account for any additional economic factors arising out of the imposition of an ongoing royalty.”). Indeed, ActiveVideo’s bargaining position is even stronger after this appeal. We leave the procedural aspects of how to proceed on the issue of prospective damages to the discretion of the district court.
The Federal Circuit further explained that some of the Amado factors considered by the district court in its sunset royalty analysis might not be appropriate to consider when calculating an ongoing royalty. Those might include the defendant’s likelihood of success on appeal, the ability of the defendant to immediately comply with the injunction, and the evidence and arguments found material to granting the permanent injunction.
IV. Effect on Apple v. Samsung
The Federal Circuit’s teachings in the ActiveVideo case are likely to have significant influence on Judge Koh’s upcoming decision on Apple’s request for an injunction prohibiting future sales of infringing smartphones in the Apple v. Samsung case. In the fist instance, she is likely to be guided by the ActiveVideo opinion in determining whether to impose the injunction Apple wants. If she decides not to impose the injunction, then she will likely refer to it if she needs to impose an ongoing royalty.
July 5, 2012
The Damaged are Welcome; the Merely Annoyed are Unwelcome in Federal Court
Two recently-decided cases brought by Apple illustrate the necessity of identifying real harm to one’s business before filing a lawsuit in federal court. The court dismissed the first, Apple v Motorola, because Apple was unable to show that it had been damaged by the alleged patent infringement. In contrast, Apple achieved a tremendous victory in Apple v. Samsung. The court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting Samsung from selling its new Galaxy Nexus smartphone, because Apple was able to demonstrate that it was likely to suffer irreparable harm if Samsung was permitted to continue to infringe Apple’s patents.
Apple v. Motorola illustrates the types of claims a business should not pursue. At the end of that case, Apple was left with claims that Motorola had employed two features subject to its patents, the value of which Apple could not quantify. At bottom, the court’s reaction was “stop wasting everyone's time.” Finding that Apple would not be able to prove any money damages, and could not prove entitlement to an injunction, the court dismissed the case. The court gave the back of its hand to Apple’s claims that the court should issue a declaration that Motorola had infringed or award symbolic “nominative” damages. The court wrote: “You can’t go into federal court and say you had a contract with X and X broke it and you’re really annoyed even though you sustained no injury of any sort (in fact you made money because you re-contracted at a higher price) so please give me a judgment for $1 that I can pin on my wall.”
Apple v. Samsung, on the other hand, illustrates precisely the type of case a business should pursue. In that case Apple was able to show that, unless the court issued a preliminary injunction, Apple would be likely to lose not only phone sales, but immeasurable additional sales when purchasers of the Galaxy Nexus followed that purchase with purchases of other Android products and applications rather than the Apple products and applications they would be likely to purchase if they first purchased an iPhone. The size of the victory for Apple is reflected in the size of the bond the court required Apple to post: $95 million, the amount of profit Samsung asserted it would lose if it could not sell the Galaxy Nexus. It seems intuitive that Apple is correct that the smart phone is a “gateway” device that leads one to purchase additional products that use the same operating system as the phone. Therefore posting the $95 million bond (which is unlikely to be posted in cash, and which will be returned to Apple unless Samsung succeeds in overturning the injunction on appeal or otherwise proving that the court was wrong to grant the injunction) to knock out the Galaxy Nexus seems like it will be good business for Apple.
The take away for businesses should be that there is little utility in starting lawsuits out of spite. Although you may cause your adversary to incur legal fees and suffer disruption caused by litigation, you are bound to incur costs like that of your own, and to lose momentum when the strong action you trumpeted at the outset of the case turns into fodder for your adversary at the end. On the other hand, Apple v. Samsung teaches that despite the incessant protests of those who would curtail the protection given to IP owners, those who do suffer actual harm can still obtain not mere vindication, but effective relief in federal court.
January 4, 2012
Post-License Use of Trademark Is Counterfeiting
A former trademark licensee’s continued use of a trademark after termination of the license constitutes trademark counterfeiting. That is the holding in a recent District of Indiana default judgment case, Century 21 v. Destiny Real Estate.
The court explained:
If an unrelated entity had created an identical trademark and provided authorized goods or services (or the kind provided by the owner of the mark) under that mark, there would be no question that there was counterfeiting. The Court can conceive of no reason why an ex-franchisee should escape liability for counterfeiting simply because that person had access to a franchisor’s original marks because of the former relationship and therefore did not need to reproduce an identical or substantially similar mark.
Other courts have come to differing conclusions on this issue, in various contexts. In a 1997 case, the 6th Circuit held that a franchisee’s holdover use of a trademark was not counterfeiting. The 9th Circuit held that the licensee’s holdover was counterfeiting in a 2005 case involving continuing use of the Idaho potato certification mark.
The significance is that pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1117(b), if he is found to be a counterfeiter, the former licensee can be liable for statutory damages (up to $2 million in cases of willful counterfeiting), and will be liable for three times profits or damages, whichever amount is greater, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee unless the court finds extenuating circumstances. If he is merely an infringer, statutory damages are not available and treble damages and attorneys’ fees are less certain to be awarded. They may be awarded subject to the principles of equity.
The Century 21 court’s damage, injunction and individual liability analyses also are noteworthy. Century 21 sought its actual damages plus treble damages. The court held that such an amount would be quadruple, rather than treble damages, one multiple too many. The court further reduced the award to two times damages, on the ground that the liquidated damages provided for in the license agreement and awarded by the Court coincided with the actual damages, and therefore to awarded treble damages in addition would again result in quadruple recovery.
On a cheerful note for trademark owners, the Court granted a permanent injunction, finding that the injury especially justifying injunctive relief is the loss of control over and harm to its valuable name and trademark, in which it has invested substantial effort and money over time to develop goodwill. If that is going to suffice under Ebay, trademark owners may not need to be as concerned that injunctions against infringers will be harder to come by.
The court declined to impose liability on Destiny Real Estate’s principal. After surveying the law on individual liability for corporate trademark infringement, the Court found that Century 21’s allegations that the individual was President of the company and authorized or approved of the misconduct were not sufficient bases to hold the individual liable for the corporation’s infringement.
